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ABSTRACT 1.0 BACKGROUND
The United States National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) is in the midst of a space
exploration program called Constellation to send crew and
cargo to the international Space Station, to the moon, and
beyond. As part of the Constellation program, a new
launch vehicle, Ares I, is being developed by NASA
Marshall Space Flight Center. Designing a launch vehicle
with high reliability and increased safety requires a
significant effort in understanding design variability and
design uncertainty at the various levels of the design
(system, element, subsystem, component, etc.) and
throughout the various design phases (conceptual,
preliminary design, etc.).
This section provides some background on the new NASA
launch vehicles, and an overview of some ofNASA
applications of probabilistic methods since the Challenger
accident.
1.1 New NASA Launch Vehicles
The new NASA launch vehicles, the Ares I and Ares V, are
shown in Fig. 1 in comparison with the heritage vehicles,
the Saturn V and the Space Shuttle. The arrows between
the vehicles in the graphic indicate hardware commonality.
Figure 1. Ares 1 and Ares V Launch Vehicles in
Comparison to Heritage Launch Vehicles
The Ares I launch vehicle, being developed by NASA's
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), consists of three
major elements as shown in Fig. 2: A solid First Stage (FS),
an Upper Stage (US), and an Upper Stage Engine (USE).
Its payload will be a crew exploration vehicle, called Orion,
which is being developed by the NASA Johnson Space
Center (JSC). Orion consists of a crew exploration module,
, a service module, a spacecraft adapter, and a launch abort
system (LAS).
In a previous paper [1] we discussed a probabilistic
functional failure analysis approach intended mainly to
support system requirements definition, system design, and
element design during the early design phases. This paper
provides an overview ofthe application of probabilistic
engineering methods to support the detailed
subsystem/component design and development as part of
the "Design for Reliability and Safety" approach for the
new Ares I Launch Vehicle.
Specifically, the paper discusses probabilistic engineering
design analysis cases that had major impact on the design
and manufacturing of the Space Shuttle hardware. The
cases represent important lessons learned from the Space
Shuttle Program and clearly demonstrate the significance of
probabilistic engineering analysis in better understanding
design deficiencies and identifying potential design
improvement for Ares I. The paper also discusses the
probabilistic functional failure analysis approach applied
during the early design phases of Ares I and the forward
plans for probabilistic design analysis in the detailed design
and development phases.
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Figure 2. Ares I Expanded View
The Ares V, also being developed by MSFC, consists of the
following as shown in Fig. 3: a liquid Core Stage with 6
RS-68 engines augmented by 2 five-and-one-half segment
Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB); an Interstage; an Earth
Departure Stage (EDS) with a single J-2X liquid rocket
engine; and a large Shroud.
The intended purpose of the Ares I is to safely deliver crew
and cargo to a specified ascent target. This capability will
support two separate missions: to carry the payloads to the
International Space Station (ISS); and to deliver crew to
orbit for rendezvous with elements of Ares V and lunar
modules for lunar missions. Primary objectives of the Ares
I design are to significantly increase safety and reliability
and reduce the cost of accessing space.
Before getting into the discussion of the subject of this
paper, it is important to note that the Constellation Program
has in place ambitious quantitative requirements for Loss of
Mission (LOM) and Loss of Crew (LOC). The LOM and
LOC requirements (or equivalents) have been allocated to
the Ares I and its major elements, the FS, the US, and the
USE. Satisfying these requirements will constitute an
ambitious goal that has forced a paradigm shift at NASA.
This has set the stage for establishing a working
environment that integrates various disciplines (safety,
reliability, design, etc.) and various organizations
(engineering design organizations, project office, and safety
and mission assurance organization) more effectively to
support the design process. Within this integrated
environment, this paradigm shift has also set the stage for a
new era at NASA in applying a sound probabilistic design
approach to analyze, understand, and influence the design
up front and throughout the different phases ofthe design.
This paper discusses the application of probabilistic
engineering methods that have been used to support the
early phases of design and will be used to support the
detailed subsystem/component design and development as
part of the "Design for Reliability and Safety" approach for
the new Ares I Launch Vehicle.
1.2 Overview of NASA Applications of Probabilistic
Methods
lunar injection of the module for lunar missions. The Ares
V will also deliver cargo to orbit and potentially deliver a
single-launch solution to the Moon with combined CEV
and lunar lander payloads.
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Figure 3. Ares V Expanded View
The intended purpose of the Ares V is to deliver a lunar
module to earth orbit with the EDS then performing a trans-
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After the Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986,
NASA began incorporating quantitative risk assessments
(QRA) in decisions concerning the Space Shuttle and other
NASA projects. For example, QRA has been extensively
used in areas such as risk management of flight hardware,
trade studies, and reliability prediction of new hardware. In
the risk management area, life limits based on QRA are
being used in the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
program [2]. Some of these cases are partially or fully
discussed in this paper.
At the system level, NASA Headquarters has led several
studies to predict the overall Space Shuttle risk. The first of
these Space Shuttle QRA studies was conducted in 1988 by
Planning Research Corporation [3]. In 1995, Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC) conducted a
comprehensive QRA study [4]. In July 1996, NASA
conducted a two year study (October 1996 - September
1998) to develop a model that provided the overall Space
Shuttle risk and estimates of risk changes due to proposed
Space Shuttle upgrades [5].
After the Columbia accident, NASA conducted a QRA on
External Tank (ET) foam. This study was the most focused
and most extensive risk assessment that NASA has
conducted in recent years. It used a dynamic, physics-
based, integrated system analysis approach to understand
the integrated system risk due to ET foam loss in flight [6].
Most recently, a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for
Ares I has been performed in support of the Constellation
program.
In the following sections we discuss some of the Space
Shuttle applications in probabilistic engineering design
analysis and the current and potential future application of
probabilistic engineering design analysis for Ares I vehicle
2.0 THE NEED FOR PROBABILISTIC
ENGINEERING DESIGN ANALYSIS -
DETERMINISTIC VERSUS PROBABILISTIC
DESIGN
To determine the factor of safety for a design, the designer
traditionally assumes a single value for stress that is equal
to some maximum or nominal value So, depending on how
the individual defmes the factor of safety for a particular
application. Similarly, the strength is assumed to be
deterministic and equal to some nominal or minimum value
Ro. As shown in Fig. 4, if nominal values are used we can
end with two different designs that have the same factor of
safety but different reliabilities. This illustrates why a
probabilistic
Figure 4. Situation Where Factors ofSafety are the Same
but Reliabilities are Different
engineering design analysis approach is recommended in
support the conventional deterministic approach to account
for the uncertainty in the design parameters [7,8].
Probabilistic engineering design analysis can be applied at
the various phases of the design as long as information is
available on the strength or capability (materials properties,
etc.) and stress or demand (loads, environments, etc.)
parameters. Generally this would be during the preliminary
design (PD) phase forward. For instance, during the
subsystem and component design and development,
probabilistic design analysis can be used to assist the
designer in making decisions on the best material or on the
best balanced design with respect to several design criteria.
At the hardware certification stage, probabilistic design can
be used to determine if a component meets its life
requirements. Finally, probabilistic design can be used to
manage the risk of a product or system put into service. In
this paper, probabilistic design will be discussed for the
situation in which it is felt to have the greatest potential for
a large influence on the design, namely in the detailed
design and development phases.
In the probabilistic engineering design approach during
design and development, each parameter controlling design
life can be defined and treated as a random variable. These
life-controlling parameters are uncertain for two reasons.
First, it is known that there will be some amount of
variability regardless of how well the parameter is known.
Secondly, it is not known at this phase how well the
engineering analyses and models being used will correlate
with the actual component parameters. Both of these
uncertainties contribute to variability. This would mandate
the use of engineering safety factors in traditional
deterministic design. Probabilistic design analysis permits
the assessment of the actual distributions of these life-
controlling factors and of the interactions with each other,
thus providing an evaluation of component risk.
For example, if it were desired to calculate the low cycle
fatigue (LCF) life of a specific feature of an impeller rotor,
it would be a function of rotor geometry and material
properties (e.g., density, modulus of elasticity, and
coefficient of thermal expansion) and the cyclic stress from
rotor speed and other loads. In simplistic terms, it is
necessary to assign distributions to each ofthese basic life
drivers, (e.g., modulus of elasticity, coefficient of thermal
expansion, rotor speed), have a set of equations to map
these basic life drivers into the high level life-controlling
parameters (e.g., crack growth rate), transform the high
level life controlling parameters into an LCF life via a
failure model, and then iterate through these steps several
times until a distribution of lifetimes is constructed.
To describe the probabilistic design approach, a generalized
probabilistic design analysis model structure is shown in
Fig. 5. Although no two probabilistic models are identical,
all of them contain similar elements of Fig. 5.
Engineering Life Driver
IModels Variation
1
Simulation of Life Driver
Engineering Transformation
Models
~
Failure Models
!
Crack Growth and Life Distribution
Inspection from ProbabilisticAnalysis
Any Available
Test Data
Final Life
Distribution
probabilistic study on the potential removal of External
Tank weld inspections [11]. In 1998 the reliability of a
critical weld of the Space Shuttle SRB aft skirt was
analyzed using the probabilistic analysis software known as
NESSUS [12]. Also in 1998, as part of SSME upgrades
introduced after the engine was put in service, NASA and
Rocketdyne developed probabilistic engineering models to
evaluate the reliability of several failure modes for the
channel wall nozzle option. Between 1998 and 2000, as
part of their support to the Space Shuttle risk assessment,
Pratt & Whitney developed probabilistic models for about
30 failure modes for the SSME turbo-pumps [13]. Many
other application of probabilistic engineering analysis at
NASA can be found in [14].
3.1 The SSME Alternate Turbopumps (ATD) Case
In this section we discuss an application of probabilistic
engineering modeling and analysis during the design and
development of the SSME ATD. This example application
addresses the fracture failure mode of the inner race on the
roller bearing of the Pratt & Whitney High Pressure Fuel
Turbopump (HPFTP). The inner race fracture location is
shown in Fig. 6.
Figure 5. Generalized Probabilistic Design Analysis Model
Structure
As indicated by the life driver variation element, all
important parameters which affect life are assigned a range
or distribution of realistic values rather than some "worst
case" value. Note that several different probability/
statistical distributions exist, such as Weibull, normal,
lognormal, beta, uniform, etc., for describing the pattern of
variation of life drivers.
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3.0 THE SPACE SHUTTLE APPLICATIONS
Right after the Challenger accident an extensive
probabilistic engineering analysis methodology
development was conducted by the NASA Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL). This included several applications to
Space Shuttle hardware [9]. Since then a large number of
probabilistic engineering design analysis cases have been
performed within NASA in support of the decision-making
process for the Space Shuttle program. A few examples
will follow.
In 1987 an extensive probabilistic engineering analysis
effort was conducted to evaluate the reliability of the
turbine wheels for the auxiliary power units (APU) of the
Space Shuttle SRBs [10]. In 1994 NASA conducted a
Figure 6. Roller Bearing Inner Race Fracture Location
The analysis intent was to estimate the probability of
fracture due to the hoop stress exceeding the material
strength. A Monte Carlo simulation model of the failure
logic was developed with probabilistic models applied to
the stress contributors and material capability, expressed as
allowable loads. Fig. 7 illustrates the model.
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4.0 THE ARES I APPLICAnONS
In this section we provide an overview of Ares I
probabilistic engineering design applications during the
system design phase and discuss the current and forward
plans for the detailed design and development phases
4.1 The Ares I Probabilistic Analysis during Early
Design Phases
The following is an overview of the probabilistic functional
failure analysis (PFFA) approach that was adopted by the
Ares I project during initial design in preparation for the
preliminary design phase.
Figure 7. HPFTP Roller Bearing Inner Race Probability
Model
In order to calculate the hoop stress it was necessary to
determine materials properties variability. Of those
materials properties that affected the total inner race hoop
stress such as, for example, the modulus of elasticity and
the coefficient of thermal expansion, a series ofequations
was derived which mapped these life drivers into the total
inner race hoop stress. Similarly, a distribution on the
materials capability was derived. In this case, life drivers
such as fracture toughness, crack depth and length, yield
strength, among others, were important. The resulting
materials strength distribution was then obtained through a
series of similar equations.
A Monte Carlo simulation was then used to calculate a
random hoop stress and random materials strength. If the
stress exceeded the strength in the simulation, a failure was
assigned to the run. Otherwise, a success was recorded.
After a large number of simulation runs was conducted, a
failure distribution was established for the inner race.
To summarize, engineering information with statistical
models can be used to probabilistically characterize design
parameters and determine design reliability. The
probabilistic models can be used for both prediction as well
as performing sensitivity analyses to identify design
improvements. In fact, the analysis detailed above led to
uncovering a major material capability problem for the
turbo pump bearing cage caused by induced manufacturing
stresses. The material could not withstand the predicted
flight loads which resulted in a crack in the bearing cage.
A material with different properties was used which
reduced the probability of a crack to near zero and
significantly improved the reliability of the turbo pump
bearing cage.
The PFFA approach is a dynamic top-down scenario-based
approach intended to identify, model, and understand high
system risk drivers for the purpose of influencing both
system design and system requirements. This approach is
implemented upfront during the initial system design phase
preceding the preliminary design review (PDR). The focus
of the Ares I PFFA was on energetic or dynamic events and
significant changes of state for the launch vehicle that
could lead to LOM or LOC.
The first step in the PFFA was to define the mISSIon
timeline of system level functions. The applicable Ares I
mission timeline includes the pre-launch and ascent phases.
The system level functions during the phases include fuel
load, crew load, pre-start, launch, staging (FS separation
and USE start), LAS jettison, main engine cutoff (MECO),
and orbit insertion with Orion separation from the Upper
Stage.
Given the mission timeline of system level functions, the
next step in the PFFA was to identify for each system level
function the lower-level functions to a selected level of
indenture. These lower-level functions were then
transformed into a failure structure by restating each as
functional failure or failure event. Next, the functional
failures are analyzed for their effects on the applicable
physical design. The resulting failure effects, labeled as
hazards or undesired conditions, were grouped by
commonality of their effect on an element or the launch
vehicle. These groupings were labeled as failure bins
which are listed for further analysis.
Given the list of failure bins, the next step in the PFFA was
to determine the "bounding" failure scenario for each bin.
The "bounding" failure scenario is selected based on the
frequency of occurrence, the impact on system risk, and the
potential for design improvement.
Given the "bounding" failure scenarios, a short list (a
handful of scenarios) was established, based on project
priorities, for further in-depth focused analysis.
Specifically, the items on the short list were subjected to in-
depth physics based dynamic simulation modeling to
understand the physics of failure, the probability of launch
vehicle failure or break up, and the launch abort system
capability to save the crew [1].
4.2 The Ares I Current and Forward Plans for the
Detailed Design and Development Phases
During the early design phase through the system PDR,
several mission events or issues were identified and
pursued for in-depth analysis. Examples of these critical
areas/issues are first stage separation and the system thrust
oscillation. In the separation study an integrated
probabilistic analysis was performed which supported the
design solution. In the thrust oscillation case probabilistic
analysis was used to evaluate the risk of the various viable
design solutions from which one was chosen. Both areas
were addressed by the time of the system PDR.
Because of the extensive heritage hardware used in the
Ares I vehicle, the Ares I elements (FS, USE, and US) had
completed their PDR and were starting their critical design
review (CDR) while the system design and system PDR
was underway. As a result, concurrent with the PFFA and
integrated probabilistic design analysis, an extensive
probabilistic design analysis (PDA) effort has been
performed at the component level. Examples include US
tank buckling, US tank weld structural failure, USE gas
generator fuel valve failure, fire/explosion due to fuel and
oxidizer leaks within the interstage (part of the US), and
USE oxidizer turbopump (OTP) and fuel turbopump (FTP)
inducer high-cycle fatigue (RCF). Because of export
control restrictions details ofthe cases listed above cannot
be released at this time.
With regard to future work, a tremendous amount ofPDA
is planned for the detailed and development phases. The J-
2X PDA activity is a good example of how NASA has been
applying and will continue applying PDA to support design
decisions during the detailed and development phases.
The J-2X program applies PDA as part oftheir physics-
based reliability modeling to a selective set of J-2X failure
modes. The complexity of their detailed PDA can range
from a full scale probabilistic design model that addresses
all critical engineering random variables through computer
simulations to probabilistic accumulation ofthe fatigue life
damage fraction that correlates to the mission failure
probability, or to a simple stress-strength interference
failure probability calculation. The analysis ties the
prediction to the engine operating parameters, such as
temperature, pressure, speed, dynamic loads, and correlates
the prediction data with future engine development test data
for reliability model anchoring. The J-2X program
screening criterion for identifying the PDA candidate items
includes the following:
1) High failure probability and consequence;
2) Failure history in similar parts;
3) Uncertainty in material properties, loads, environment
and manufacturing;
4) New designs or risk items tracked by program or IPTs.
Based on the screening criterion, a short list of candidates
for probabilistic design analysis is established as forward
work to support the design process. The short list includes
critical failure modes on the OTP, FTP, main combustion
chamber, and nozzle.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The authors of this paper tried to describe a changing
environment with regard to using probabilistic engineering
design analysis to support the design process. This
changing environment has started after the Challenger
accident and evolved over the last twenty years to reach a
broader design community of both the Space Shuttle and
the Ares I. The literature and applications of probabilistic
engineering design analysis to the Space Shuttle hardware
has provided a significant amount of learning and guidance
to the Ares I community to continue maturing the
probabilistic design technology. Currently a significant
amount of probabilistic design work is planned as part of
the forward work for all the Ares I elements.
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